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The organization of a safe environment at the enterprise is formed up not only due to 
the perfection of safety regulations and their observance, but also due to the fact that all the 
proposed safety measures are fully consistent with production needs and can be considered as 
a function of ensuring the development of production. The relevance of the study is determined 
by the fact that the use of modern systems for the formation and establishment of the safety of 
the production process allows you to boost production activities and positions of the enterprise 
in the foreign market. The novelty of the study is determined by the conformity of the proposed 
regulatory indicators and the form of their approval at the enterprise. The authors put the 
mathematical model at the basis of the proposed indicators, which corresponds to the main 
decisions of modern quality standards. The article shows the possibility of determining 
diversity and the formation of requirements that are recommended for implementation based 
on operational indicators of the enterprise. The authors present a mathematical and graphical 
model for integrating safety requirements into the overall structure of the production process. 
The practical significance of the study is determined by the possibilities of the formation of 
individual requirement parameters for ensuring the safety of the production process for local 
industries. 
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The problem of estimating uncertainties has been and remains one of the key 
issues for discussion at specialized international scientific conferences: probabilistic 
safety and management assessment conducted by the International Association of 
Probabilistic safety and management assessment; probabilistic assessment and safety 
analysis by the American Nuclear Community (Brown 2002). The topic of 
uncertainty assessment also does not go unnoticed at international scientific 
conferences (Huang et al. 2019). As part of the study, an analysis of the materials of 
PSAM/PSA conferences in recent years was carried out, as well as other scientific 
publications and reports on the subject of uncertainty assessment (Wang & Shao 
2010). Based on the analysis, the following may be noted (McLain & Jarrell 2007): 
– the following are seen as promising mathematical theories for estimating 
uncertainties: probability theory, theory of possibilities, theory of fuzzy sets, interval 
analysis; 
– the issue of separation of aleatory and epistemological uncertainties using 
numerical methods (the two-phase Monte Carlo method) is considered, however, no 
consensus has been reached on the separation of uncertainties; 
– individual studies are aimed at establishing correlation coefficients between 
input parameters and output value (for example, studies are conducted using the 
SUSA calculation code to estimate model uncertainty); 
– the importance of identifying sources of uncertainties and their 
consideration in decision-making is noted in international publications. 
Constraining factor for the wide practical use of the methodology of 
probabilistic safety modeling of complex technological systems is significant 
resource for the development of computational models without the use of software 
tools (Akkarawatkhoosith et al. 2019). This is due to the following (Zhao et al. 2007): 
a large number of system elements (basic elements); exponential dependence of the 
dimension of models on the number of elements; high structural complexity of real 
systems, limited typical fragments for decomposition of systems; dynamism of the 
modeling process. The only solution to the problem of dimensionality of models and 
optimization of resources for model development is the automated technology of 
probabilistic modeling (Byrd et al. 2018). In general, modeling automation provides 
(Fan et al. 2013): full formalization and practical implementation of computer-aided 
presentation of structural schemes of systems and criteria for their functioning; the 
use of algorithms and software implementation of all processes of converting 
structural schemes and criteria into the corresponding computational mathematical 
models of systems. 
 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
The security document must contain a reliable and evidence-based basis, for 
this it is necessary to ensure the possibility of updating it as: equipment 
modifications; receiving feedback from internal and external operating experience; 




in-depth understanding of production processes or the development of an accident 
and improvement of modeling techniques. The update is necessary to take into 
account: design changes; operational changes; organizational changes. The 
frequency of updating the document on safety and standardization, adopted in 
international practice, varies for different enterprises. However, it is very important 
to monitor all changes that occur and evaluate their impact on the results of risk 
monitoring. If the changes are significant, you will need to update the security and 
standardization document as quickly as possible (Liping & Yun 2015). Typically, 
design models are updated after scheduled maintenance repairs (SMR); full 
documentation updates can be done later (Polukarov et al. 2020, Levchenko & 
Polukarov 2020). 
Since each modification of the enterprise is evaluated as it is introduced, it is 
recommended not to accumulate a package of such ratings for a period of more than 
one year. In the absence of modifications that require changes to the models of safety 
and standardization document, the update is carried out at least once every four to 
five years. The safety and standardization document should be updated at each time 
it is used to justify changes to the licensing basis (Zhai et al. 2013). To ensure an 
adequate representation in the enterprise model, the update is performed after the 
modification of the enterprise. After each modification, the terms for updating the 
security and standardization document and data documentation are set depending on 
the impact of the modification on the enterprise security level (Kruzhylko et al. 2017). 
Documentation of data can be divided into two main areas: documenting the source 
data on the performed modifications of the enterprise and documenting the results of 
viewing the document on safety and standardization in case of an urgent and 
scheduled update (Lv & Zhang 2014). When documenting the source data of 
enterprise modifications, all modifications must be documented in the update 
materials. In case of significant changes, it is possible to develop a new version of 
the relevant document on safety and standardization. Regardless of the significance 
of the modification, it is necessary to update all the databases used in the safety and 
standardization document to display the current status of information regarding the 
enterprise (Pei & Liu 2019). 
To develop and update a document on safety and standardization, an 
enterprise must have a permanent group (or unit) of engineering personnel consisting 
of (at least): system analysis engineer; data analysis engineer; engineer for the 
analysis of personnel reliability; software engineer – specialist in the development of 
programs based on the analysis of mathematical, as well as other probabilistic models. 
The quality of work performed as part of the implementation of the safety and 
standardization document should be ensured taking into account the requirements of 
quality assurance instructions in the analysis and assessment of safety. The manuals, 
procedures and instructions used in the work should contain quantitative and 
qualitative criteria for acceptability to ensure that important actions are performed 
satisfactorily in accordance with accepted standards and methods. 
 






MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Uncertainty estimation methods can be simplified into two groups: 
1. Statistical methods. These are methods of probability theory, which are 
based on the fact that inaccuracies in the input parameters are probabilistic in nature, 
that is, their values have a certain probability density distribution function with 
corresponding numerical characteristics. Combinations using a random number 
generator of probabilistic values of input parameters lead to probability density 
distribution functions of the possible value of the resulting parameter, when its 
deviations are also probabilistic in nature. 
2. Analytical methods. These are methods based on various mathematical 
theories: the generalized perturbation theory method, the sensitivity method, the 
quantile estimation method, the fuzzy set theory method. 
Today, statistical methods are dominant in the process of estimating 
uncertainties. Their algorithms and mathematical models are well developed and 
implemented in probabilistic calculation codes (SAPHIRE, RiskSpectrum). 
Analytical methods can be considered as an alternative to traditional statistical 
methods. At the same time, the use of analytical methods for estimating uncertainties 
is limited due to the need to adapt mathematical theories to solve practical problems 
of safety documentation and standardization. Promising is the application of the 
theory of fuzzy sets. The application of the theory of fuzzy sets in the analysis of 
system reliability and the construction of the enterprise modernization process is 
developed in foreign publications, and work is also being carried out in a number of 
technology companies in the same direction. 
Of particular interest is the two-phase Monte Carlo method, with which you 
can highlight the aleatory and epistemological uncertainties. When using the two-
phase Monte Carlo method, the uncertainty of equipment unavailability is estimated, 
which is a function of two quantities: failure rate (λ) and recovery rate (μ). The inner 
loop of Monte Carlo statistical modeling corresponds to the aleatory uncertainty 
(randomness of failure time and recovery time – exponential distribution), the outer 
loop corresponds to epistemological uncertainty (inaccuracy in estimating equipment 
failure time and recovery time – lognormal distribution). For each iteration of the 
calculation, the values of the parameters in the external loop are randomly selected 
from the given distribution and transferred to the internal loop. In the internal loop, 
random values of time to failure and recovery time are generated, taking into account 
which the system logic is calculated. For each iteration in the inner loop, the 
distribution of system unavailability is constructed, which takes into account the 
stochastic nature of failures and system recovery. The result of a given number of 
iterations is a family of distribution curves, where each curve characterizes the 
aleatory uncertainty, and the family of curves is an epistemological one. 
Based on the results of a literature review and a study of the current state of 
the problems of uncertainty assessment, it is concluded that there are no principles of 




risk information decision-making in the national regulatory framework (Mokoena & 
Oberholzer 2015). The work is dedicated to filling this gap in the regulatory 
framework (Dyrdonova et al. 2018). The basic principles that are presented later were 
introduced in the regulatory document (Sato et al. 2011). The objectives of risk-
informed decision-making on the safety of facilities were originally formed (Li-
Ping & Jian-Yuan 2014): 
– improving security by identifying and considering factors that have a 
dominant influence on security and implementing measures to improve security; 
– a comprehensive assessment of the impact of decisions on safety, taking into 
account the results of risk assessments in addition to deterministic assessments and 
operating experience; 
– optimization of operation due to the concentration of resources on the factors 
dominant in terms of their impact on safety, structures, systems and elements; 
– a reasonable reduction in the excess conservatism and restrictions that were 
taken into account when developing the project and the safety justification. 
Risk-informed decision-making can increase safety and reliability, reduce 
personnel impact and increase operational efficiency by (Tan et al. 2010): identifying 
and eliminating safety problems; improving and optimizing maintenance, repair and 
testing of structures, systems and components in order to ensure their reliability 
sufficient to maintain the achieved level of safety; focusing on structures, systems 
and components that have a dominant influence on safety (Saurin et al. 2004). 
The existing relationship between the methodology of probabilistic and 
deterministic safety analysis is demonstrated by the example of the implementation 
of a strategy for the sustainable functioning of an enterprise (Jung et al. 2008). The 
quantitative criteria developed for making risk information decisions are to reduce 
the need for risk information decisions, described later (Schwartz & Rogers 1996). 
The adoption of risk-information decisions on the introduction of modifications 
important to safety regarding current procedures and technical regulations is 
permitted provided that this does not lead to an increase in the production cycle or an 
increase in the deterioration of the socio-economic situation of enterprises. At the 
same time, the implementation of risk-informed decision-making is allowed only if 
corrective measures are implemented that belong to the same security function as the 
decision itself and ensure that the current risk values are not exceeded. 
To implement practical tasks using risk-information approaches, the 
following probabilistic indicators are recommended when making decisions: 
– when assessing and ranking violations in the operation of enterprises for 
their detailed analysis and development of appropriate corrective measures, those 
violations in the operation of the enterprise are selected in which the conditional 
probability of the violation becoming a serious accident is 10-3 or more; 
– to optimize maintenance programs, as well as support inspection activities 
when ranking the structures, systems and elements of an enterprise by their impact 
on safety, the values of probability indicators are used as criteria of high significance. 
 





RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Consider the problem of verifying the compliance of probabilistic safety 
indicators with regulatory criteria in a general statement. Let there be some safety 
indicator and its maximum permissible value (normative safety criterion). The 
condition for observing the safety criterion is written as follows (Eq. 1): 
 𝑥0 ≤ 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑑  (1) 
Equation (1) describes the deterministic situation of the analysis, when it is 
assumed that there is an exact value of the safety indicator 𝑥0  and unconditional 
compliance (or non-compliance) with the criterion. The presence of uncertainty in 
the value is acceptable𝑥0 and we will consider 𝑥0 as the mathematical expectation 
𝑥0 = 𝑀[𝑥]  of a random variable 𝑥  distributed according to one of the known 
distribution laws with a probability density 𝑓(𝑥) by distribution function 𝐹(𝑥). 
The probability that the random variable does not exceed the maximum 
permissible cell value 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑑 , will be determined by the value of the distribution 
function (Eq. 2): 
 𝑃(𝑥 ≤ 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑑) = 𝐹(𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑑)  (2) 
Thus, in the stochastic formulation of the problem, there is always a certain 
probability of exceeding the maximum permissible value 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑑 , which will be 
determined by the equation (Eq. 3): 
 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑃(𝑥 > 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑑) = 1 − 𝑃(𝑥 ≤ 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑑) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑑) (3) 
The value 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑  is equal to the area of the region of the probability density 
function 𝑓(𝑥) (Eq. 4): 
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Acceptable excess probability 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑  of acceptable criterion value 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑑  – is a 
subject of a separate study; for practical reasons, it can be argued that this should be 





 can be quite a difficult task, because it cannot always be expressed 
through elementary functions. In some cases, the solution of the problem is possible 
only approximately by numerical methods. 
The calculation of 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑  for the normal distribution law. The normal 
distribution law (Gaussian law) plays an extremely important role in probability 
theory and has special significance among other distribution laws. This distribution 
law is most often encountered in practice. The main feature that distinguishes the 
normal law of distribution from others is that it is the limit to which other distribution 
laws approach. It can be shown that the uncertainties are the sum of a sufficiently 




large number of independent random variables (uncertainties). The normal 






2𝜎2   (5) 
where 𝑚 = 𝑀[𝑥] – expectation value 𝑥; 𝜎2 = 𝐷[𝑥] – its variance. The distribution 
curve according to the normal law has a symmetrical hill-like form. The maximum 
ordinate of the curve, equal to 
1
√2𝜋𝜎
, corresponds to the point 𝑥 = 𝑚; with distance 
from point m, the distribution density decreases, and at 𝑥 → ±∞  the curve 
asymptotically approaches the abscissa. The distribution function of the quantity with 
the normal distribution law has the form (Eq. 6): 
 














  (6) 
Random value of 𝑥 cell has a standard normal distribution if 𝑚 = 𝑀[𝑥] = 0 
and 𝜎 = √𝐷[𝑥] = 1. In this case, the density and distribution function of the standard 
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  (8) 
Equation (8) is called the Laplace function. Distribution function of normally 
distributed quantity 𝑥  and arbitrary values 𝑚  and 𝜎  are expressed through the 
Laplace function as (Eq. 9): 
 𝐹(𝑥) = 𝛷(𝑥) = 𝛷 (
𝑥−𝑚
𝜎
)  (9) 
Random value ℎ =
𝑥−𝑚
𝜎
 is called a standardized or normalized random 
variable; it has a standard normal distribution. Back to the equation (4), considering 
𝑥0 = 𝑀[𝑥] = 𝑚  as the mean of a random value of depletion 𝑥  with normal 
distribution law and dispersion 𝜎2, find the probability of exceeding the permissible 
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 (10) 
Therefore, the probability of exceeding the allowable value of the criterion is 







  (11) 
The calculation of 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑  for the lognormal distribution law. The lognormal 
distribution is in many ways more accurate than normal, describes most random 





variables in nature and technology, especially for those objects whose failure occurs 
due to wear or fatigue. If the value 𝑙𝑛𝑥 has a normal distribution with the expected 
value 𝑚  and variety 𝜎 , then the value 𝑥  considered logarithmically normally 






2𝜎2   (12) 
The distribution function for the lognormal law has the form (Eq. 13): 
 

















and is not expressed through elementary functions. Numerical characteristics of a 
value distributed according to the lognormal law: 
1) expected value (Eq. 14): 
 𝑀[𝑥] = 𝑒𝑚+
𝜎2
2   (14) 
2) variance (Eq. 15): 




  (15) 
Assume 𝑋 is random variable distributed according to the lognormal law with 
parameters 𝑚, 𝜎 and cell distribution function 𝐿(𝑥,𝑚, 𝜎). Then, in accordance with 
the definition of the lognormal distribution law, the random variable (Eq. 16): 
 𝑌 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑋)  (16) 
will be distributed normally with mathematical expectation (Eq. 17): 
 𝜇 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑚) (17) 
and variance 𝜎. Therefore (Eq. 18): 
 𝐿(𝑥,𝑚, 𝜎) = 𝑁 (
𝑙𝑛𝑥−𝑚
𝜎
)  (18) 
where 𝑁(𝑥, 0,1) = 𝛷(𝑥) is standard normal distribution, which is expressed through 
the Laplace function (8). Therefore, to obtain the value of the distribution function 
for the lognormal distribution, it is enough to calculate the values of the distribution 
function for the standard normal distribution. 
The probability of exceeding the allowable value of the criterion 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑑  is 
defined by equation (3) for the lognormal distribution law, will be written as (Eq. 19): 




Probability comparison 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑 under various distribution laws. Comparison of 
probability is of interest for further practical use. 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑 exceeding the criterion 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑑 
under various distribution laws, with the help of which the uncertainty in the value 




of the safety indicator is modeled. In this case, the equivalence of mathematical 
expectation and variance in each of the distributions is assumed (Table 1). 
 




Formulas for calculating 







m – mathematical 
distribution 
𝑚 = 𝑥0 




















𝜎2 – form 
parameter 




2 + 1) 
3. Uniform:𝑓(𝑥) =
{
0, 𝑥 ∉ [𝑎, 𝑏],
1
𝑏−𝑎
, 𝑥 ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏]
 
a – left border 𝑎 = 𝑥0 − √3𝑠0 
b – right border 𝑏 = 𝑥0 + √3𝑠0 
4. Exponential: 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝜆𝑒−𝜆𝑥 




























The results obtained illustrate the dependence on the adopted distribution law 
with equal initial data. Distribution law (Eq. 20): 
 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑 = 𝑓(𝑥0 = 3, 𝑠0 = 1, 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑑 = 4)   (20) 
Normal – 0.1586553; lognormal – 0.1471852; uniform – 0.2113249; 
exponential – 0.2635971; gamma distribution – 0.1550278. Rationing of admissible 
probability 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑  exceeding safety criteria. Overall limit value 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑  can be 
determined by expert judgment as a small given probability. When normalizing 
values 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑  we can focus on the quantile (or percentile) of the normal distribution 
law 𝐹(𝑥𝛼) = 𝛼. Of particular interest are the quantiles corresponding to points on 
𝑥0 + 𝜎, 𝑥0 + 2, 𝑥𝑜 + 3𝜎 , and also 𝛼 = 𝐹(𝑥0,95) = 0,95 . We can build a scale of 
standardization of the value 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑 (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑  value normalization scale. 
Requirements level for 
𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑 
Quantile 𝛼,% Value 𝑥𝛼 𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑 
Low requirements 𝛼 < 84,14 𝑥0 + 𝜎 > 0,16 





Medium requirements 84,14 < 𝛼 ≤ 97,72 𝑥0 + 2𝜎 0,023…0,16 
High requirments 97,72% < 𝛼 < 99,99 𝑥0 + 3𝜎 0,001…0,023 
Above high requirments 𝛼 > 99,99 𝑥0 + 4𝜎 < 0,001 
 
Using the SAPHIRE code, the uncertainty of the calculated values is usually 
simulated with the percentiles calculating 5% and 95% (𝑃𝑎𝑑𝑑 = 0,05) , which 
corresponds to the standard requirement level in Table 2. The analysis method and 
its modification are the method of pairwise comparisons, used as the basic one. To 
establish the relative importance of the elements of the hierarchy (criteria for 
evaluating alternative solutions), a scale of relations (degree of significance of 
actions) was used, which allows the expert to set a certain number according to the 
degree of preference of one object over another. The criteria for nuclear and radiation 
safety are of absolute importance compared to other criteria (significance level 9). 
An algorithm for constructing a super criterion has been developed, providing for the 
following steps: 
Step 1. The construction of many matrices of pairwise comparisons. Filling in 
square matrices of pairwise comparisons is carried out according to the following 
rule. If the item 𝐸1 is dominating item 𝐸2, then the matrix cell that matches the row 
𝐸1 and column 𝐸2, is filled with an integer, and the cell that matches 𝐸2 and 𝐸1, gets 






























To get each matrix, the expert renders 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)/2 judgments (where 𝑛 – is 
the pairwise comparisons matrix order). 
Step 2. Calculation of the maximum eigenvalue of the resulting matrix and the 
corresponding eigenvector. Eigenvector calculations 𝑊 of positive square matrix А 
is performed on the basis of equality (Eq. 22) 
 𝐴𝑊 = 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑊 (22) 
where 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 – maximum matrix eigenvalue 𝐴. 
For a positive square matrix 𝐴 eigenvector 𝑊, corresponding to the maximum 





= 𝐶𝑊 (23) 
where 𝑒 = (1,1, . . . ,1)𝑇 – unit vector; 𝑘 – exponent. 
In practice, the calculations of the eigenvector are performed to achieve the 
specified accuracy 𝜉: 𝑒𝑇|𝑊𝑘 −𝑊𝑘−1| ≤ 𝜉. With sufficient accuracy for practice, we 




can accept 𝜉 = 0,01  regardless of matrix order. The maximum eigenvalue is 
calculated by the formula (Eq. 24): 
 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑒
𝑇𝐴𝑊 (24) 
Step 3. Calculation of the homogeneity index and homogeneity ratio. The 
valid value is 𝐵𝑂 ≤ 0,1. If for the matrix of pairwise comparisons the homogeneity 
ratio 𝐵𝑂 > 0,1, then this indicates a significant violation of the logic of judgments 
made by the expert when filling out the matrix, therefore, the expert is invited to 
review the data used to construct the matrix in order to improve uniformity. 
Step 4. Construction of the criteria priority vector using the normalization of 
the eigenvector. 
Step 5. Determination of weight coefficients for individual criteria and 
construction of a supercriterion. At the input, to make a decision on choosing the 
optimal alternative, we have (Eq. 25): 
 𝑈(𝑎) = ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑢𝑘(𝑎) → 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑛∑
𝑘=1  (25) 
where 𝛽𝑘  – weights obtained using the hierarchy method, 𝑎 – alternative; 𝑢𝑘(𝑎) – 
random variable characterizing the value of the criterion 𝑘, 𝑢𝑘(𝑎)~𝑁(𝜇𝑘, 𝜎𝑘
2). 
To evaluate the alternatives, the Hodge-Lehman test was modified to be based 
simultaneously on the minimax Wald criterion and the Bayes-Laplace criterion. The 
utility function of the alternatives is defined as (Eq. 26): 
 𝐻𝐿(𝑎) = 𝛼𝐸 ∑  𝑛𝑘=1 𝛽𝑘𝑢𝑘(𝑎) + (1 + 𝛼)∑
𝑛















 – guaranteed 
result; 𝛼  – parameter that expresses the degree of confidence in the probability 
distribution used. If the trust is high, then the Bayes-Laplace criterion is accepted, 
otherwise the guaranteed result is preferred. The decision is made on 
condition (Eq. 27): 
 𝑎* = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎𝐻𝐿(𝑎)  (27) 
Therefore, the basic principles of making risk information decisions and the 




The basic principles of risk information decision making are developed, which 
is a combination of deterministic and probabilistic methods. It should be noted that 
the assessment of uncertainties is an integral part of the process of making risk 
information decisions at the stage of verifying compliance with established 
requirements and safety criteria and, in fact, when making a risk informed decision. 
A detailed concept has been developed, which is the main tool for the practical use 
of established requirements and safety criteria. 





The basic principles, stages and criteria for making risk-information decisions 
that can be implemented in a regulatory document are formulated. To develop 
regulatory requirements, a method for accounting for uncertainties has been 
developed, consisting of two structural blocks: accounting for uncertainties when 
checking compliance with regulatory safety criteria; choosing the right solution from 
a variety of alternatives for a set of criteria. 
To select the appropriate solution from many alternatives for a set of criteria, 
the method of pairwise comparisons is used. In order to establish the relative 
importance of the elements of the hierarchy, a scale of relations is applied, which 
allows the expert to set a certain number according to the degree of preference of one 
object over another. The criteria for nuclear and radiation safety were endowed with 
absolute significance in comparison with other criteria. An algorithm for constructing 
a super criterion is developed. To evaluate the alternatives, the Hodge-Lehman test 
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